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Abstract 
Future political priorities for science and technology (S&T) policy formulation usually rest on a rather 
simplistic interpretation of past events. This can lead to serious errors and distortions and can 
negatively affect the innovation system. In this article we try to highlight the riskiness involved in 
policy making based on traditional R&D indicators and trends. We would emphasise that this 
approach does not take account of structural aspects crucial for the analysis of the innovation system. 
We examine the implications for science, technical and human resources policies of the political 
challenge of R&D convergence in a peripheral EU region. Three scenarios are developed based on 
application of the same criteria to the trends observed in traditional R&D input indicators. 
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Introduction 
Academics, politicians and consumers in the industrialised countries are paying greater 
attention to science and technology (S&T) policies, which is resulting in a widespread 
tendency to devise and use indicators to improve and consolidate policy design and 
evaluation. Looked at in isolation, this could be seen as positive, since the existence of more 
indicators can result in better designed more tailored policy. It also helps in evaluating 
outcomes more reliably, on the basis of specific measurements that demonstrate achievement. 
However, some caution is called for in applying these indicators [FELLER and GAMOTA, 
2007], because a reliance on past events to set future priorities can lead to serious errors that 
could distort the formulation of policies. 
One cause of such distortion is the application of neoclassical-type measures, such as the 
decision to subsidise R&D activities within a short-term horizon on the basis of a 
structuralist-evolutionary inspired policy design [LIPSEY and CARLAW, 1998], which can 
have consequences that extend beyond a government’s term of office (commonly four years 
in Spain). 
A second cause of distortion, which is clearly related to the first, but is far more 
compromising for those in the government, arises when innovation system indicators are used 
for political ends; that is to say, with a time horizon corresponding to the life of the 
government in power. The measures derived from these indicators may have very different 
medium and long-term repercussions than those foreseen for the immediate four-year period. 
The common denominator in many of these cases is how the ratio between gross expenditure 
on R&D/gross domestic product (GERD/GDP) is used as the basis for political agendas. 
There are examples in the political messages embodied in proposals such as the Lisbon 
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Strategy, which fixes the GERD/GDP target for the European Union at 3% by 2010 
[COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2003], and in the Compromiso 
Ingenio 2010 report, which sets the target at 2% for Spain [MINISTERIO DE LA 
PRESIDENCIA, 2005]. Following this fashionable trend several Spanish regions3 have used 
these indicators to establish their goals for science and technology policies. For instance, the 
Valencian Government planned in its 2001-2006 R&D Plan to reach the target of 2% in 2006 
[GENERALITAT VALENCIANA, 2000] and recent statistics show that the actual value for 
this year was just 0.8% [INE, 2008a]. 
Within this context, we attempt to show the consequences of simplistic political forecasts 
based on R&D indicators, by analysing the future evolution of the Valencian Innovation 
System (VIS),4 starting from a baseline determined by current R&D indicators. We intend to 
demonstrate the structural consequences, which are not considered in such a political exercise, 
and discuss how they translate into unrealistic goals.  
The article is organised in five sections. First, we describe the theoretical framework for the 
development, interpretation and application of R&D indicators. In order to put the analysis 
into context, we provide a brief description of the current characteristics of the VIS and then 
propose some hypotheses about the likely evolution of key indicators. These hypotheses are 
the basis for three scenarios, which will lead to and support certain conclusions and 
consequences.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
The need to develop methodologies to improve the design and implementation of S&T 
policies has been felt at all levels in Europe – regional, national and supranational – and the 
fashioning of new instruments to achieve policy objectives has become imperative. At the 
same time, we are witnessing a change of paradigm in the political context. Whereas, in the 
past, certainty and long-term considerations dominated the way that political actions were 
conceived, today the design of actions to promote R&D activities is being determined more 
and more by uncertainty and medium-term considerations. 
Neoclassical-type measures, designed to encourage R&D activities through subsidies or other 
types of incentive for countering shortcomings in the market system (market failures), are 
giving way to other kinds of actions that are intended to have a structural impact and to affect 
the behaviour of responsible economic operators. Thus, politicians are trying to change both 
the ideological framework and the design of their actions [LIPSEY et al., 2005]. However, 
often these changes are introduced too suddenly, and in the absence of adequate experience in 
the design and implementation of R&D incentives, can have unfortunate consequences. There 
is a lack of consistency between policy design, which may be in harmony with structuralist-
based ideas, and the actions proposed to achieve the objectives of the policy, which tend to 
hark back to neoclassical-based mechanisms [MOREAU, 2004]. This lack of synchrony 
between policy design and policy instruments has prompted numerous studies in the literature 
on technological change [TASSEY, 2001; MOLAS-GALLART and DAVIES, 2006] and has 
led some observers to advise caution to some of the politicians and managers involved. This 
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lack of consistency also reflects the neoclassical interpretation of R&D activities. 
Structuralist-based policy implementation requires cultural change at both policy-making 
level and among the rest of the economic agents involved in the innovation system 
[ALBERTOS, 2002] if it is to succeed in the long term. Furthermore, the use of narrow input 
indicators as a basis for a ‘policy message’ regarding the system’s performance, has long been 
criticised. According to Lundvall (1992:6): “There are two obvious problems with this 
indicator [GERD/GDP]. First it reflects only an input effort and does not say anything about 
what comes out of the effort. Second, R&D expenditure is only one kind of relevant input to 
the process of innovation – learning in connection with routines activities may be more 
important than R&D”. 
The influence of neoclassical theory on politicians remains strong and they generally assume 
a direct and positive relationship between GERD/GDP effort and innovation system 
performance, ignoring other (even more) important factors such as the relationships among 
the system’s agents [MEYER, 2006; LEYDESDORFF and MEYER, 2007; WONG and HO, 
2007; among others], whose influence on performance of the innovation system is widely 
acknowledged. In addition, application of this indicator is easy and to a great extent simplifies 
the elaboration of policy messages. However, the innovation system is complex, with 
connections among many variables and in many different ways, which are not adequately 
reflected in these policies [GODIN, 2007; MARTIN, 2008]. 
The need to refashion S&T policy has been accompanied by a growth in the design and 
accumulation of indicators to assign values to diffuse activities such as R&D and its medium 
and long-term implications [KATZ, 2006]. The standard manuals for the measurement of 
R&D and innovation activities fail to provide sufficient guidance5. Indeed, a large part of the 
literature on the study and application of indicators is devoted to the use of functional, 
behavioural and performance indicators in political programmes and activities [SHAPIRA, 
2003; RUEGG and FELLER, 2003, among others]. There is also a healthy literature that 
explores and analyses the political uses (good and bad) to which indicators have been put 
[GODIN, 2002; CHOBANOVA, 2006]. What all these studies have in common is that they 
find there is a discrepancy between the political messages, which have a time horizon limited 
to one term of legislative office, and the way that certain indicators of the current state of an 
innovation system are used to provide ‘objective’ support for these messages. The greatest 
risk lies in the inability to foresee the medium and long-term effects of these measures on 
others that are related but are not taken into account by policy makers. 
The latter literature aims at cautioning politicians and policy-makers against short-sighted, 
misapplication of these indicators while at the same time seeking to provide a more solid 
foundation on which to formulate S&T policy in such a way that the messages it carries will 
be consistent with the evolution and significance of multiple interrelated indicators. 
Managers and politicians have a responsibility to pursue policies through their entire life 
cycle, from initial orientation, through design and management planning, until the end, which 
only comes when the results are analysed [DÍEZ, 2002]. This final outcome of the policy 
cycle can then serve as input for a new policy cycle. Throughout the iterative process, it is 
essential that actions are fed and supported by accurate, adequate and timely information. 
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The literature on the economics of technological change has established the defining 
characteristics of R&D activities and had proposed new schools of thought that have 
influenced and will continue to influence the design of policies for stimulating R&D. Finally, 
it has shown that policies with a medium or long-term horizon (depending on the activity in 
question), are more likely to succeed and be consistent with the assumptions on which they 
are based. 
 
Summary of the Valencian Innovation System (VIS) 
To put the analysis in this paper into context we describe some features of the VIS. Valencia 
is a peripheral region of the EU6 and has been examined in depth [FERNÁNDEZ-DE-LUCIO 
et al., 2001; GARCÍA-ARACIL et al., 2002]. In demographic terms, Valencia is home to 
10.6% of the population of Spain;7 the percentage of the employed population is 10.8% and it 
accounts for 9.7% of the total Spanish GDP. The seeming inconsistencies in these percentages 
are because Valencian per capita income is about 90% of the national average. The 
unemployment rate, which is a significant social indicator, is 9%, slightly lower than the 
national average of 9.2%. 
In terms of the production structure, the agriculture and energy sectors in Valencia are of 
minor importance: they represent less than 5% of GDP and a little more than 4% of 
employment, hence less than in Spain nationally. On the other hand, the weight of industry is 
higher than the national average (18% compared to 16.7%). The breakdown of the figure for 
industry shows that there is a large set of medium and low-tech technologies8 (non-metallic 
mineral products, particularly ceramics; textiles, leather, shoes and foodstuffs) that account 
for 50% of the total; knowledge-intensive sectors (chemicals; mechanical, electrical and 
electronic machinery and equipment; manufacture of transport equipment) comprise only 4% 
of GDP and 3.5% of employment. The construction sector and non-knowledge-intensive 
services (commerce, hotel and catering trades, estate agencies, etc.) account for almost 50% 
of GDP. We discuss the implications of this structure for R&D activity in a later section of 
this paper. 
Another factor important to the production sector is education and training of human 
resources. In 1994, the proportion of university graduates in the Valencian workforce was 
lower overall than the Spanish average (5.5% vs 7.7%) [MAS et al., 2007], though with large 
variations in some sectors such as industry and services. The figures had improved in 2004, 
by which time the differences between Valencia and Spain as a whole had been reduced to the 
point where graduates represented 10.1% of the Valencian workforce. In some sectors the 
proportion even surpassed the national average, for example agriculture (5% vs 1.9%), 
construction (4.5% vs 3.2%) and non-sales services (33% vs 29%). The non-sales services 
sector (health, education, government, etc.) has the highest percentage of workers with higher 
education, both in Valencia and in Spain. 
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Against this background, we examine the main Valencian R&D activity indicators for 2005 
(see Table 1). The level of the resources allocated to R&D, both financial and human, is 
somewhat lower than nationally –1.5 points according to the social and economic indicators 
referred to above, which explains why the indicators for GDP and the number of employed 
are below the national average. The lowest Valencian indicator is for innovation; this is 
largely due to the production structure [CASTRO-MARTÍNEZ and FERNÁNDEZ-DE-
LUCIO, 2006], and especially the weakness in the medium and high-tech manufacturing 
sectors and the scarcity of medium-large firms. 
 
TABLE 1 IS ABOUT HERE 
 
Although the figures for Valencia are below Spanish average, all indicators have improved 
substantially since the mid 1990s, and especially from 2002. The average compound rate of 
increase in R&D expenditure for the period 1995-2005 was 15%, although personnel did not 
kept pace: average compound growth rate of R&D personnel was only 11%, and that of 
researchers 10%. The VIS is also characterised by a high percentage of SMEs (like Spain and 
other EU countries, with more than 89% of the total number of firms) but, contrary to Spain 
and EU countries, R&D effort is concentrated in these types of firms. EU firms with at least 
200 employees perform 84% of Business Enterprise R&D (BERD), and the figure for Spain is 
55% accounting for 43% of researchers. Valencian large firms are responsible for only 16% 
of BERD and they employee 9% of researchers. 
Table 1 also gives the distribution of R&D expenditure, personnel and researchers by sectors. 
The organisation of the R&D effort in Valencia has advanced considerably since the 1990s, 
when industry and business were responsible for barely 30% of expenditures and employed 
only 13% of researchers. Nevertheless, and despite considerably increased effort in the last 
decade, Valencia has not managed to catch up to the Spanish national averages. The gap is 
most marked in number of researchers, a key factor in this type of activity. In terms of 
production structure, Industry in Valencia is mainly medium and low-tech, and this has a 
significant impact on the level of expenditure that the business sector devotes to R&D. 
If we look at the number of researchers with a PhD, we can see that the Valencian higher 
education system produces on average9 700 doctor graduates [INE, 2008b] per year which is 
around 10% of the total for Spain.  
Within Europe, EU indicators for comparing regional innovation systems assign Valencia a 
relatively low ranking. Table 2 presents the values for this indicator and the factors that 
contribute to it. Its overall value of 0.36 places Valencia in 130th position among the 208 
regions in the EU-25; the lowest relative contributors to the overall index are percentage of 
employment in medium and high-tech service industries and percentage of R&D expenditure 
by the business sector as a proportion of GDP. 
 
TABLE 2 IS ABOUT HERE 
 
Another revealing indicator is the percentage of Valencian BERD financed by government 
(4% in 2005) compared to Spain (13.5%) and the EU-25 (8.4% in 2004). The number of 
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Valencian innovating firms10 which received public funding for innovation activities in 2003-
2006 increased to 1,316 (22% of the total) [ALTO CONSEJO CONSULTIVO DE LA CV, 
200811] out of a total of 5,993 innovating firms, while the EU-25 and Spain registered 9% 
respectively. This shows that Valencian BERD is much more fragmented than Spanish or EU 
BERD and the insignificant proportion in terms of individual firms, is irrelevant. 
Again, we should emphasise the relatively small role of the most R&D intensive sectors, 
namely the high-tech (HT) and medium-high-tech (MHT) sectors. The number of HT and 
MHT enterprises in Valencia (2,800, or 12.3% of the Spanish total) is similar to other Spanish 
regions, but only 483 of them are truly HT and their turnover and economic importance are 
limited. In terms of workers, the numbers employed in HT and MHT represent only 7.3% of 
total Spanish employment and 5.6% of Valencian employment; almost all of this is in the 
MHT and service sectors. The number employed in the true HT sectors is 6,800 out of a 
working population of 2 million [INE, 2007b]. In Spain overall, 67% of business and industry 
R&D expenditure is concentrated in the HT and MHT sectors, as well as 64% of personnel 
and 70% of researchers12 (the EU-25 is in the middle range of this indicator; and in Valencia, 
these sectors account for 51% of R&D expenditure and employ 54% of the personnel - FTE). 
Valencian industry is dominated by the traditional sectors and by policies that were framed 
many years ago, which channelled R&D into the setting up of a network of technology 
centres to provide R&D services for the firms in those sectors. 
 
Data and methodology: potential future scenarios for the Valencian R&D effort 
In what follows, we propose a forward-looking analysis of how gross expenditure on R&D 
activities (GERD) and number of researchers, which are the subject of policy discourse, may 
change. These are the benchmarks that are usually used when establishing the main objectives 
of S&T policies. In this way we try to show the challenges posed by seeking to achieve 
specific values for GERD as a percentage of GDP, and the effect on other directly related 
R&D activity indicators. Three possible scenarios can be envisaged for these two key 
variables: (a) conservative change, based on developmental hypotheses that fit the trends 
established in the region in recent years; (b) moderate change, which supposes a faster rate of 
development that is more in line with Spanish S&T policy challenges; and (c) optimistic 
change, which would bring Valencia up to the present average for the EU-25 and is based on 
meeting the EU targets foreseen in the Lisbon Strategy. This last is also the target for Spain 
proposed in the Ingenio 2010 programme [MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA, 2005]. In 
all three cases the time horizon for our analysis is 2010. 
In all these hypotheses we apply linear regressions. We are not trying to do an econometric 
modelling, but rather we want to simplify the number of initial variables and propose growth 
criteria that are easily adjustable, but retain the same sorts of simplifications and assumptions 
made in policy discourse. The aim is to try to demonstrate the consequences of these 
messages. The hypotheses can be summarised as follows. 
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1. Forecast evolution of regional GDP. The data for the 2005 baseline are taken from 
Contabilidad Regional de España, Base 2000 [INE, 2007d]. The forecasts for growth in 
2006-2008 are based on a report by Hispalink [2007]; those for 2009 and 2010 are based on 
the OECD forecasts for Spain (Hispalink does not have projections for these years). Table 3 
shows the changes in GDP growth rates in Valencia starting from the base year 2005. 
TABLE 3 IS ABOUT HERE 
 
2. Forecast evolution of Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) in relation to the 
GDP (GERD/GDP ratio). Based on the above forecast, we develop three alternative vectors 
of change, shown in Table 4. They start from a base GERD/GDP of 0.99% in 2005. The 
conservative forecast would suppose a GERD/GDP of 1.2% in 2010, which corresponds to an 
increase in GERD that is in line with the trend in Valencia over the last 10 years. The 
intermediate (moderate) prediction would be 1.32%, which is the figure that Spain is expected 
to reach if the trend over the last 10 years continues. The optimistic forecast would expect a 
ratio of 2% by 2010, which corresponds to present EU levels, and is also as forecast in 
Ingenio 2010. 
 
TABLE 4 IS ABOUT HERE 
 
3. Hypothetical structural evolution of GERD. In this hypothesis, a second variable factor 
is introduced into the three scenarios, namely the structural evolution of GERD 
implementation, divided between the business sector (mainly business firms) and the public 
sector (including higher education and government). A comparative examination of R&D 
indicators in different countries shows that a higher percentage of GERD is performed by 
enterprises in the more advanced countries than in the less developed ones [LEGLER et al., 
2006]. An examination of the present situation in Valencia reveals that – as in other regions 
with relatively low levels of R&D effort – most of the effort, in terms of both R&D 
expenditure and number of researchers, comes from the public sector. Therefore any growth 
scenario must take account of which sectors are presumed to undergo the greatest increases. 
In line with this, three possible sectoral distributions for future GERD can be projected (Table 
5). The first assumes that the region maintains the structural change trend established over the 
last 10 years, which shows a distinct bias towards the scientific sector, which accounts for 
62% of GERD. The second represents progress from the current situation to a level matching 
the present national average (45% scientific and 55% production). The third envisages a 
progression in which the Valencian structure would match the present EU average, and the 
business sector would account for 64% of GERD. In all cases, R&D carried out by non-profit 
private institutions is not included. 
 
TABLE 5 IS ABOUT HERE 
 
4. Hypothetical development of researchers’ working resources (annual R&D 
expenditures per researcher in each sector). To quantify the number of VIS researchers 
available for developing R&D activities under each of our scenarios, we use the ratio of 
working resources per researcher in each sector, i.e. annual R&D expenditure divided by 
number of researchers. The ratio differs greatly among sectors. We extrapolated the results for 
each sector, for each of the three scenarios, based on trends in the 10 years from 1995-2005. 
We should point out that we base our forecast of the trends in these ratios on linear 
regressions, to try to capture the sorts of political assumptions made in the setting of political 
priorities. The conservative scenario applies the Valencian trend, the moderate scenario the 
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Spanish trend, and the optimistic scenario the trend in the EU. Table 6.a summarises the start 
and end points for each scenario and each sector; Table 6.b presents the respective linear 
regression equations. Although our linear regression estimates are based on a fairly long time 
span (10 years previous to 2005) due to the somewhat erratic behaviour of the ratio for the 
business sector, the results are not robust (see the R2 indicator values for the business sector 
scenarios in Table 6.b). 
 
TABLES 6A AND B ARE ABOUT HERE 
 
On the basis of the above forecasts, and assuming that the first (GDP development) is a 
constant, we can generate 27 scenarios based on combinations of the three proposed 
alternatives for each of the three hypotheses. Below we present the results for three of the 27 
possible scenarios; these are based on application of the same criteria (conservative, moderate 
or optimistic) to all the variables considered: (1) changes in the GERD/GDP ratio; (2) 
distribution of R&D expenditure between the public and business sectors; and (3) annual 
R&D expenditure per researcher in each sector. We believe that this approach illustrates the 
potential consequences of each of the scenarios for the VIS, as well as the interrelationships 
among the variables. 
 
Results 
Figure 1 depicts the growth that would occur in the public sector if the present trend were to 
continue (i.e., the conservative scenario). Ultimately, there would be a convergence with the 
optimistic scenario in absolute, but not relative terms. Were this to happen, the levels of 
public sector expenditure and the drain on the public coffers would become unsustainable. 
The curve representing the optimistic scenario shows that in this scenario there is a 
simultaneous reduction in the sectoral distribution of expenditure and increase in researchers’ 
working resources to the point where they coincide with European levels. 
 
FIGURE 1 IS ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of Valencian BERD. The optimistic scenario (i.e. achieving EU 
levels) would require a tripling of BERD in five years. Based on the current Valencian 
production structure, which is mainly mid and low-tech sectors, this is hardly realistic. The 
firms in these sectors have experienced annual growth of 12% during the past decade; thus 
annual growth rates of 20% and 30% (respectively for the moderate and optimistic scenaries, 
Figure 2) for BERD would be unviable. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 IS ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Figure 3 depicts the changes in the number of researchers (FTE) in the public sector under the 
three scenarios. It shows that the conservative scenario assumes a continuation of the present 
trend and hence a progressive increase. This would result in an unsustainable level as it would 
involve and increase of around 50%, more than 90% of which would have to be financed 
from public funds. The moderate scenario envisages a level of growth that would be more 
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acceptable to government, while the optimistic scenario would also be very difficult to 
achieve in the public sector.  
 
FIGURE 3 IS ABOUT HERE 
 
In terms of business sector researchers (Figure 4), even the conservative scenario foresees a 
net increase of more than 1,600; while the moderate and optimistic scenarios – and especially 
the latter – call for substantially bigger increases. The graph in this figure shows that effort 
that would be required to catch up with the EU-25 researcher numbers (and with the 
corresponding GERD) would be truly enormous. Therefore, no matter how desirable the 
target might be, it would in practical terms be out of the question in such a short time span. If 
we correlate this information with the number of PhD students graduating per year in the 
Valencian region (around 700), and make the rather simplistic assumption that all researchers 
have a PhD degree, we can see that the Valencian higher education system would not have the 
capacity even to cover the conservative scenario (a net increase of 3,388 researchers for the 
period analysed: 1,753 for the public sector and 1,635 for the business sector) and certainly 
would not be able to satisfy the moderate and optimistic scenarios (near to 3,800 and 8,000 
respectively from Figures 3 and 4). 
 
FIGURE 4 IS ABOUT HERE 
 
In terms of policy, the optimistic scenario is completely unattainable since it would entail 
very profound changes, both structural and cultural, in the region. This would be completely 
impossible within a four year legislative term. Furthermore, such deep changes could only be 
envisaged if the policy were targeted not at any one particular sector, but were to be the result 
of unanimous agreement among all the stakeholders: political groupings, business people, 
trade unions, etc. Unfortunately, such agreement would be beyond the control of any party; 
even if it were achievable, results could not be expected to come to fruition in such a short 
period of time. 
The moderate scenario falls within the scope of political planning. However, it fails in terms 
of industrial structure: the region’s productive economy seems not to be capable of attracting 
or creating HT and MHT enterprises, which are those firms whose innovations are mainly 
based on the promotion of R&D activities. In addition, the structure of firms would need to 
change, since we have observed that mid-size firms execute the larger proportion of BERD 
and employ a higher number of researchers. We have also observed that researchers in the 
public sector are not trained in the specialities that are most in demand. In other words, 
regional S&T policies are not providing incentives for researcher training tailored to demand 
(either present or likely future demand) from the new technology-based enterprises. It is true 
that the moderate scenario would require a great effort from both the production sector and 
the public sector authorities; however, firm commitment to it would bring very important 
changes that in the long term could become a sound basis for the much deeper and more 
lasting change envisaged in the optimistic scenario. 
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Conclusions 
We have tried to demonstrate that the political use of basic R&D indicators to support a short-
term political agenda is meaningless. The analysis in this paper should be of interest to 
politicians in highlighting that some R&D indicators are no more than input measures and do 
not necessarily (directly and positively) correlate with the performance of the innovation 
system. Furthermore, the use and interpretation of these indicators ignores the connections 
with other important aspects of the innovation system, which, if not considered, will lead to 
misleading and inaccurate policy messages, which could have dramatic consequences in the 
medium-long run. This simplistic analysis makes it clear that the consequences of certain 
political engagements looking only at the two sides of S&T policies, financial and human 
resources and how they influence each other, can be negative. 
The specific case we analysed was the hypothetical evolution, in a five year period, of the VIS 
in terms of three possible outcomes. Our baseline was constructed by information from the 
previous 10 years. Each scenario shows the effort required to reach the goals proposed, and 
makes it clear that in some cases this is both unfeasible and even could be harmful to the 
system. It is clear that S&T policies should be formulated on structural-based measures which 
must be consistent with the nature of R&D activities, and able to influence the behaviour of 
the economic actors in the public and business sectors and in the medium and long term. 
Descriptive indicators are not enough. Effective policies should be seen within a longer time 
frame than a government’s term of office. In our scenarios, we showed that the long-term 
consequences of some policy goals can be unrealistic if not harmful. Short-sighted use of 
analytical indicators may produce inaccurate, damaging and misleading policy advice. 
We would highlight two preliminary conclusions regarding our methodology, which relate 
primarily to the quality of the data. Our baseline information is fairly reliable; it is data that 
have been audited for budgetary purposes, which is normal for public sector activities. 
However, the quality of the business sector information varies greatly and therefore makes 
attempts to forecast trends and demonstrate fits unreliable. Also, applying statistical 
techniques, no matter how sophisticated, to such erratic and unreliable initial data leads to 
results that are not robust. This in turn leads to conclusions that do not make economic sense, 
and means that as a basis for policy formulation they are ill-advised. 
In this context, it should be assumed that politicians’ forecasts tend to be rather general and 
do not distinguish between the public and business sectors. In the former sector, the data on 
R&D activities are fairly carefully monitored and their evolution is more predictable. In the 
business sector, it is difficult to check the behaviour of the variables, because they depend for 
the most part on the efforts of the enterprises themselves (even when government policies in 
the form of R&D subsidies and incentives are present). The result is likely to be a political 
message that lacks robustness because it is based on unreliable data, but which nevertheless 
sets some overall objectives. In the short term these objectives may seem highly desirable, but 
they could have some hidden harmful long term effects on the innovation system in the form 
of increasing imbalances. We also showed that there is a low proportion of publicly funded 
Valencian BERD, which reflects the low level of influence of S&T policy. A change in the 
cultural behaviour of firms regarding innovation activities is required. Such change might be 
driven by policy incentives to promote a different consideration of business innovation 
activities.  
We must emphasise that it is difficult for policy to have an effect on the business sector 
participants in an innovation system when the initial forecasts that determine the key variables 
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in a developmental scenario are unreliable. Political action is needed to steer the behaviour of 
the business community and bring about much deeper and more lasting change at structural 
level. Such action cannot be decided based on the evolution of the GERD/GDP ratio, the 
number of researchers in the business sector, or any other kind of descriptive indicator. This 
type of action needs to promote change in the attitude of the economic agents towards R&D. 
Deep cultural change among all the economic agents in the innovation system is required to 
design and implement effective S&T policies that are based not on the mere evolution of 
figures and ratios, but on long-term structural changes. Only then will the sector’s behaviour 
indicators shift, in the medium term, to reflect the values implied in the political messages. 
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